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Whereas the new millennium brought with it a focus on “collision rules” within global governance and
corporate governance, the economic crises emerging out of 2008 turned the focus to the failure of
regulatory practices. The current crises challenge not only a neoliberal hegemony but the New
Deal/Great Society coordinating state model as well; as we have moved not only beyond a society of
individuals to a society of organizations. We live now in a society of transnational network contracting
and corporate governance practices. This society of networks can no longer be clearly associated with
traditional conceptions of state, market or civil society/ public versus private. Amidst this crisis,
emerging legal challenges can no longer be coped with by institutions and ritualized routines of laissezfaire liberalism, social liberalism or neoliberalism. This paper redirects focus to an increasingly
disembedded style of contracting amidst multi-polar and multi-rational regimes of conflict regulation/
dispute resolution. In doing so this paper starts from the prism of contracting practices and rituals:
arguing that an understanding of how the discourse of “governing contracts” is continually and
irreversibly implicated in the evolution of a network of heterarchical private relationships and public
institutions.
By 1930, Weimar legal scholars on the left like Franz Neumann and on the right Carl Schmitt had posed
the related issues of pluralism, heterogeneity in complexity, and heterarchy versus hierarchy as the core
issues in the new twentieth century. In the Anglo-American tradition, this argument was taken up most
prominently by Harold Laski. Succinctly, the legal and political challenges is one of “complementary
institutions” (Schmitt’s jurisprudential term). Complementary institutions come to force amidst the
background of “principal institutions” such as the partnership, the firm and the individual prerogative
contract that they were originally intended to augment and serve through auxiliary legal interpretations
and practices.
In the absence of an internationally agreed-upon labor regime, current practices of transnational
standard-setting, especially in the setting of labor law norms, involves essentially the privatization of
self-regulation. (Peer Zumbansen:”The Transnational Laws of Corporate Governance & Labor Rights”,
2005.) Numerous transnational institutions/actors have been linking international labor rights with trade
liberalization initiatives. Transnational standard-setting has become essentially inter-corporate/ transcorporate codes of conduct. At the turn of the twentieth century, Max Weber observed significantly, that
in contrast to the “hard law” of an official state-based constitutional order, there had emerged in the lawcreating capacity of autonomous collective associations a new domain of “soft law” serving as
constituted supervening norms.
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Further, Philip Selznick by 1969 started to use the term reflexive law to refer to the necessary
“regulation in the procedural coordinating of open networks of reciprocal complexity and
interdependence. (See here the ongoing theorizing of Charles Sabel who raises the question: How are
benchmarked norms and autonomous reflexive law continually bootstrapped?
Private governance codes in an epoch of global capitalism are by and large not the result of bargaining,
but the ultimate discretionary action of corporations. Thus, transnational standard-setting is increasingly
challenging the traditional capacity of domestic labor law: that is, law within a national set of borders.
Transnational standard-setting and transnational private law are constructed outside formal government
rule-making as a regime of contextual preferentiality, a veritable set of self-enforcing norms of
reciprocity (SERN). Such transnational practices include: performance standards; interoperability
standards; ratcheting labor standards; ecological standards. Transnational law represents an emergent
semi-autonomous self-regulating subsystem within a complexly differentiated global society of states
and networks. This complexity amounts to a heterarchical rather than a hierarchical ordering with new
modes of monitioring interest representation and the securing of transparency. French economists refer
to these norms as normes de reciprocite auto-executoires and introduce a new economic concept:
reciproqueteurs. (Cf. the rational choice theorizing of Elinor Ostrom.)
Where institutional complementarity, as well as the interdiscursivity and interoperability of SERN
proceduralism come to predominate we advisably need to consider Chris Ansell’s notion of network
institutionalism (2006) which resists centralized or dirigiste administration. Network institutionalism
recognizes that network interactions are more diffuse than discrete, more social than interpersonal. In
contrast to a simplistic neoliberal approach rooted in the naturalness of markets, network institutionalism
emphasizes the significance of normative commitment and committedness to trust and credibility.
Argumentation networks involve more than just bargaining. They emphasize persuasion and
justifiability through warranted assertions and generalizable norms. Mutual monitoring and learning
among network participants is encouraged along with a sense of mutual accountability and dedication to
improve performance.
Institutional complementarity can also be understood in what is referred to as reflexive governance by
Guenther Teubner: who presently holds the London School of Economics labour law chair held by
Franz Neumann’s fellow Weimar labor lawyer comrade and Schmitt student, Otto Kahn-Freund.
Network institutions reciprocally compensate for each other’s own deficiency. Complementary
institutions can reinforce each other’s effects as a set of visible, trusted and credible autonomous
institutional practices.
As Harry Arthurs,the Canadian labor law colleague of Peer Zumbansen at Osgoode Hall, noted at a
UCLA comparative law forum – paraphrasing a French general witnessing the “charge of the light
brigade” at Sebastopol in The Crimean War: “It’s magnificent, bit is it war?” Transnational network
standard-setting is overwhelming, but is it law? Beyond their medical bretheren, are legal professionals
increasingly lawyers sans frontiers ? Is everything polycontextural? Is anything law?
The gravity shift to autonomous subsystemic self-regulation of floating regional and global networks is
rooted in standards and “best practices”, similar in the United States with The Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC)in the American contract law of fair trade usages.which prevails. The UCC is itself
established by the autonomous American Law Institute of jurists, lawyers and law professors. There has
been a renaissance of Lex Mercatoria: the customary law of merchants and traders operating abroad –
and more specifically, transnational arbitration having some legal justification in domestic national
courts. Lex Mercatoria involves to a great extent common sense “good faith’ business practices and
standards used to regulate or resolve commercial conflicts.
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As such, Lex Mercatoria is a confidential non-formalistic system of alternative dispute resolution
centered on private arbitration courts – with an emphasis on the commercial ethic of an embedded global
liberalism of the Washington free trade consensus of 1945. The new conflict of laws practice that has
emerged beyond traditional federalism is found in arbitral codes of non-formalistic discretionary ruling
and interpretation; and amounts to a new form of court shopping.
The International Chamber of Commerce reports 550 filings and 300 awards under the newly emerging
UCC of transnational commercial law: UNIDROIT –that is, the “Principles of International Commercial
Contracts.” This started informally in the 1970s and became codified in 1994. Also reported is the
growth in private arbitral courts for transnational commercial dispute resolution: 10 in 1910; 100 in
1985; over 150 in 2005.
Transnational arbitration houses become substitutes for national constitutional courts. Arbitral authority
and enforcement are turned to for legal certainty and predictable outcomes. Arbitral practices are
consolidated into stable rules and procedures of transnational law: as Philip Jessop predicted in his
prescient Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School in 1956. In some cases, arbitrators are pushed to
maximize values other than the parties’ private right to contract: pace Richard Posner and the “law and
economics movement” in jurisprudence.
Guenther Teubner sees the new Lex Mercatoria as aa corporatist legal form: a functional hierarchy of
preference, to mix Ostrom and Karl Renner. Where Teubner sees us moving to is a
heterarchical/multilateral global society of networks: where there is cybernetic coordination (“structural
coupling”) amidst spontaneous exogenous adaptation and evolving endogenous encapsulated pressures.
Rather than Friedrich von Hayek’s society of spontaneous private law creation, Teubner avoids
separation of spontaneous making of law, convention, habit and custom from constructivist making of
public law by governments and autonomous social law by functionally differentiated subsystems;
autopoeisis in the language of Teubner’s mentor Niklas Luhmann. We move from a hierarchy of law to
a polyarchy or heterarchy of legal pluralism.
What Teubner and Luhmann refer to in cybernetic terms as polycontextural logoc (PCL). With this
superseding of traditional nom-producing routines Teubner argues that there is a decline in the
legitimacy of the “rule of law”: what Jurgen Habermas refers to as the fundamental validity claims of
law are incrementally eroded. Teubner sees the shrinking potential of nation state politics vis a vis the
economy as a globalized self-deconstruction of the law-making process. The results are regimes of
autonomous law. In globalized capitalism, autonomous private law is transformable into the governance
of autonomous social law that goes beyond the “social law” ideas of the Weimar labor lawyers like
Neumann and Kahn-Freund. The functional differentiation described incrementally by Durkheim,
Parsons, Eisenstadt and Luhmann now include regimes of norm and law creation in the differentiated
domains of science, technology, medicine, education, media, the Internet, and transportation.
Contracts as Zumbansen reminds us (2007) are social arrangements that visibilize and negotiate
conflicting rationalities and interests. Under the hegemony of neoliberalism, contracting has been
interpreted formalistically, not sociologically, as the Legal Realists of The New Deal did. Expert
managerialism functionally applied is extracted from its Progressive/ Social Democrat shell.
Privatization and individual responsibility is emphasized domestically, while global private regimes are
constructed outside.
Governance by relational and network contracts have become the central regulatory concept: not
government by public administrative agencies. Governance by contract provides the arrangement of
exchanges. Governance by contract attends to the regulation of exchanges.
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Society is no longer seen as having a center or an apex. Society is understood as being comprised not by
a collective conscience, but multiple yet non-unified institutionalizing social reality constructions:
multiple rationalities. Multilateral/ multipolar. Multirational/ subsystemic/ subcultural.
To conclude, Zumbansen like Teubner sees law as normative in a pluralistic or polycontextural manner.
Law’s content is not just singularly defined by market rationalism, religious fundamentalism, or social
justice. Law reflects and regulates societal conflicts by “addressing” the internal codes involved
subsystemically or subculturally. Zumbansen in “The Law of Society: Governance through Contract”
(CLPE: Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto: 2007: p.45) affirms that
“It [the law] is always exposed to and involved in these[social] conflicts. As such, it could be said that
the law , instead of reflecting the values of individualism, collectivism or communitarianism in its
totality will only in parts reflect these or other social values.”
Contract involves obligation, not just exchange. Obligation is not solely defined by markets, property
relations and commodity exchange. Zumbansen and Teubner present an alternative understanding of
contracting as “structural coupling” and “reconciling” among social subsystems and their norms and
values, as well as intersubjective reciprocity and mutual recognition within units of social subsystems.
The institutional complementarity and polycontexturality immanent within the governance of socil law
endures.
APPENDIX:
As detailed scholarly by Ostrom, Ian Macneil and Oliver Williamson, relational contracts unlike
traditional discrete contracts between two or more legal individuals (including legal fictions for firms
known as corporations) do not define discrete transactions. Rather they are normative frameworks
defining the manner in which commercial exchanges ought to operate in practice. They do not focus on
exchange that takes place at one point of time. Rather they take a multi-year holistic and “blanketing”
approach to ongoing exchanges and performance. In more recent economics, this form of contracting
unlike neo-classical “total market” stress relationships of trust, reciprocity, integrity, solidarity, and
flexibility. Increasingly many relational contracts have become known as network contracts. Further,
Charles Sabel uses the concept “braiding” to denote institutional complementary use of pre-existing
practices of reciprocity, mutuality and solidarity of informal contractual agreements as endogenous trust
considerations within formal contracting agreements of private and social law.
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